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I
INTRODUCTION

"The problem of how best to preserve the individual wealth of the spouse
during the continuance of the marital partnership is one of the important
unsolved problems of community property law."1 So wrote Professor W.O. Huie
in 1953 apropos of Louisiana's jurisprudence, which at that time attempted to
protect the wife by making it difficult for the husband, the sole and exclusive
manager of the community property, to recover his separate estate by reimbursement. When Louisiana shifted from husband management to a general rule of
equal management of the community property in 1980, gender-specific protection
in the reimbursement rules was appropriately jettisoned. The 1980 reimbursement rules are also more sympathetic to separate reimbursement claims than to
safeguarding a spouse's interest in the community property. The rationale
behind the rules is that the spouses' common endeavor, the community property,
will be protected by permitting both spouses equally and independently to
manage the community. The legislature apparently concluded that there was no
longer a need for the reimbursement rules to protect the community property
when a spouse seeks reimbursement of his or her separate estate. As the cases
are beginning to show, however, the disposition of separate claims for reimbursement under the 1980 rules can be devastating on a spouse whose means consist
of only his or her interest in the community property. Louisiana now has a new
"unsolved problem," the reverse of the old one: how best to preserve the
community from the restoration of a spouse's separate estate at termination of
the community regime.
The theme of the 1980 revision of Louisiana management rules was clearly
one favoring the independence of both spouses. A major concern was whether
a spouse should be able to manage and obligate more community property than
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he or she alone had produced. Out of concern for the independence of a
nonearning or lesser-earning spouse, Louisiana adopted equal management as
the general management rule and rejected the Texas-style "two funds" or
"separate but equal" management system.2 Under Louisiana's equal management rule, either spouse acting alone may manage and dispose of community
property and obligate the community property for debts, whether the debts be
for community or separate purposes. 3 Whether the community property a
spouse seeks to manage or obligate was produced by that spouse is irrelevant.4
The management rules, however, are by no means unbalanced in favor of
independence. They are replete with exceptions where the independence of both
spouses or the independence of one spouse is limited for the spouses' common
good or to make the community regime workable vis-A-vis third persons. The
rules consider certain assets, such as immovables (that is, real estate) and
furnishings located in the family home, too important to the common endeavor
to be left to the independent authority of a spouse to manage and dispose. The
spouses must concur for the alienation, encumbrance, or lease of these assets.'
Likewise, concurrence is required for donations of community property other
6
than ordinary and customary ones.
Similarly, in certain instances one spouse is permitted to have exclusive
management. Commercial laws necessitated an exception for a spouse in whose
name community movables were titled, and the need for stability in the direction
of a business prompted an exception for the spouse who was in fact managing
a community enterprise without the participation of the other spouse.
The rules regulating the interspousal claim for the restoration of a spouse's
separate estate at termination of the community regime offer a startling contrast
to the balanced management rules. One might have expected a finely tuned
compromise of the sometimes conflicting goals of the spouses as independent
people and as members of a common endeavor. Instead, Louisiana's rules are
quite simple and are designed to facilitate restoration of the separate estate,
usually through reimbursement, with few qualifications or limitations.'
A
separately wealthy spouse can restore his or her separate property at the expense
of the other spouse's interest in the community property in Louisiana more easily
than in other community property states or under pre-1980 Louisiana law. In

2. See Katherine Spaht, Background of Matrimonial Regimes Revision, 39 LA. L. REv. 323,331-45
(1979); George Bilbe, Management of Community Assets Under Act 627, 39 LA. L. REV. 409,410 (1979).
See generally J. Thomas Oldham, Management of the Community Estate During an Intact Marriage, 56
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 99 (Spring 1993).
3. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. arts. 2345-46 (West 1985).
4. Such an inquiry is relevant in Texas. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. §§ 5.22, 5.61 (West 1975 &
Supp. 1993).
5. LA. CIv. CODE ANN. art. 2347 (West 1985).
6. Id. art. 2349 (West 1985).
7. Id. arts. 2350-51 (West 1985).

8. See id. arts. 2360-63, 2365, 2367 (West 1985 & Supp. 1992), discussed infra text accompanying
notes 16-43.
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some instances, the wealthy spouse may impose on the other spouse a personal

obligation for reimbursement beyond the value of the community property.
This article argues that Louisiana's rules on restoration of the separate estate
need some modification. Restoration is consistent with Louisiana's ganancial
system of community property, wherein only the gains, if any, from the common
endeavor, and not the separate capital of the spouses, are shared at termination
of the regime.9 Restoration is also consistent with Louisiana's position that
donations are not presumed; 0 restoration of separate property therefore cannot
be denied on the ground that the property was presumptively donated.
However, especially now that a spouse's interest in the community property may
be the only durable source of financial security at divorce, 1 a rule that allows
that interest to be obliterated easily by the reimbursement claim of the
separately wealthy spouse must be questioned. Neither gender neutrality nor the
general rule of equal management precludes refinements in the reimbursement
rules designed to balance independence and common purpose. Part II of this
article looks at the present Louisiana law both as it appears in the Civil Code
and as it has been applied by the courts. Part III compares past Louisiana law
to discern which considerations, other than gender, were once thought relevant
to the restoration of the separate estate. Parts IV and V examine two equal
management jurisdictions with codified law on the subject of restoration of the
separate estate, California and France, for the light they shed on the problem.
Louisiana's own recently enacted law of co-ownership is analyzed in Part VI.
Finally, Part VII recommends amendments to the Louisiana Civil Code.

9. See Nina N. Pugh, The Spanish Community of Gains in 1803: Sociedad de Gananciales,30 LA.
L. REV. 1, 34 (1969); W.O. Huie, Separate Ownership of Specific Property Versus Restitution from
Community Property in Louisiana,26 TUL. L. REV. 427 (1952). Spanish authorities, however, would not
have allowed reimbursement where separate funds were lost due to the fault of the owner or for
necessities the husband was obligated to provide the wife. Pugh, supra this note, at 29. Furthermore,
the authorities were divided on whether separate funds brought to the marriage and used for the
community were considered a donation or, alternatively, a loan to be reimbursed. Id. at 7.
10. Broussard v. Broussard, 340 So. 2d 1309 (La. 1976). See also LA. CIv. CODE ANN. art. 2343.1
(West 1985), which requires a gratuitous transmutation of separate property to community to be made
by authentic act (that is, a formal document executed before a notary public and two witnesses).
11. The extent to which Louisiana already has abandoned the concept of alimony as a pension in
favor of the concept of rehabilitative alimony is unclear. The Civil Code mandates the divorce court to
consider-when alimony is sought-the claimant's earning capacity and the time it would take to acquire
appropriate education, training, or employment. LA. Civ. CODE ANN. art. 112 (West Supp. 1992). Thus,
a spouse with present earning capacity might not receive any alimony. As for potential earning capacity
of the claimant, lower courts have interpreted the Code as permitting an award of alimony with an
automatic cut off date based upon an estimate of how long it should take the claimant to become
self-supporting, but the Louisiana Supreme Court's pronouncements to the contrary and its reluctance
to attribute potential earning capacity to spouses who have been out of the work force have so far
prevented full application of the concept. See Teasdel v. Teasdel, 493 So. 2d 1165 (La. 1986); Hegre v.
Hegre, 483 So. 2d 920 (La. 1986). The Louisiana State Law Institute has recommended the legislative
overruling of the Supreme Court cases. See La. H.B. No. 1139, § 1, art. 107, Reg. Sess., 1987. The
recommendation was not acted upon in 1987 and will be proposed again in 1993.
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II
LOUISIANA LAW SINCE 1980
A. Methods of Restoring Separate Property
Ownership tracing and reimbursement are the two methods of restoring the
separate estate in Louisiana as in all community property states. With the
demise in 1980 of the "double declaration" rule, tracing has become more
available. 2 Also, tracing is facilitated by the rule that prohibits implied and
oral transmutations of separate to community property.13 Even so, Louisiana
relies more on reimbursement than on tracing as the method of restoring the
separate estate. Whenever known amounts of separate and community funds are
used to acquire an asset, Louisiana classifies the asset as community unless the
community funds were inconsequential; the separate estate is reimbursed for the
funds spent. 4 Other community property states provide for pro-rata ownership
tracing in that situation. 5 Since reimbursement is Louisiana's primary method
of restoring the separate estate, the reimbursement rules are the focus of this
article.
B. Situations Occasioning Reimbursement of the Separate Estate
In Louisiana, spouses may claim reimbursement at the termination of the
community regime." The Civil Code divides all separate claims for reimbursement into two situations: separate property used to pay community obligations,
article 2365,"' and separate property used for community acquisitions or

12. Under the double declaration rule, immovables purchased by the husband with separate funds
in his name during the marriage were irrefutably presumed to be community property unless, in the deed
of acquisition, he had declared them to be purchased with his separate funds for his separate estate.
Absent such recitals, the husband received reimbursement for the separate funds used to acquire the
property; he did not have a choice between tracing and reimbursement. See, e.g., Peters v. Klein, 109
So. 349 (La. 1926); Sharp v. Zeller, 34 So. 129 (La. 1902). See also Tullier v. Tullier, 464 So. 2d 278 (La.
1985) (legislative abolition of double declaration rule retroactively applied).
13.

LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2343.1 (West 1985).

14.

Id. arts. 2338, 2341.

15.

See, e.g., JOSEPH W. McKNIGHT & WILLIAM A. REPPY, JR., TEXAS MATRIMONIAL PROPERTY

LAW 39 (1983); Harry M. Cross, Community Property: A Comparison of the Systems in Washington and
Louisiana, 39 LA. L. REv. 479, 485 (1979). But see California law described infra text accompanying
notes 72-82.
16. LA. CIv. CODE ANN. art. 2358 (West 1985). In Louisiana, it is not technically correct to speak
of reimbursement from "the community" or from "the community property" because the community
regime is not a legal entity, and the claim for reimbursement is really a personal claim against the other
spouse. Nevertheless, since reimbursement claims are made and satisfied during the partition of the
community patrimony, as a practical matter, the claims are satisfied from the community property
(though in one instance, as will be explained, they can exceed the value of the community property).
No harm can come from speaking of reimbursement from "the community" so long as one understands
that the amount to be reimbursed from "the community" is twice the amount that the Code articles
require the other spouse to pay. See KATHERINE S. SPAHT & W. LEE HARGRAVE, LOUISIANA CIVIL
LAW TREATISE: MATRIMONIAL REGIMES § 7.14, at 283-91 (1989).
17. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2365 (West Supp. 1992) provides as follows:
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improvements, article 2367."8 However, the use of separate property to pay
community obligations does not constitute a distinct situation occasioning
reimbursement, as article 2365 might suggest.
A couple's community property exists for two purposes: first, to be
consumed by the family in meeting its living expenses, and second, to acquire,
improve, or maintain property as investment. Thus, two situations can occasion
a claim to reimbursement of the separate estate: (1) when separate property
instead of community property has been consumed by the expenses of the
marriage and family and (2) when separate property instead of community
property has been used or spent to acquire, improve, or maintain community
investments. Community obligations may relate either to expenses of the
marriage and family or to community investments. In light of the purposes of
community property, payment by the separate estate of a community obligation
incurred to acquire a community investment should be treated under the rule for
reimbursement for acquisitions, while payment of a community obligation, the
object of which was to provide for the family, should be reimbursed according
to the rule for family expenses. The reimbursement rules differ in important
ways depending upon which of the two purposes, expenses of the marriage and
family or investments, was involved. 9

1. Expenses of the Marriageand Family. Any ambiguity in pre-1980 Louisiana
law concerning entitlement to reimbursement for expenses of the marriage and
family is now resolved in favor of reimbursement. Since such expenses are for

If separate property of a spouse has been used to satisfy a community obligation, the
spouse, upon termination of the community property regime, is entitled to reimbursement for
one-half of the amount or value that the property had at the time it was used. The liability of
a spouse who owes reimbursement is limited to the value of his share in the community after
deduction of all community obligations.
Nevertheless, if the community obligation was incurred for the ordinary and customary
expenses of the marriage, or for the support, maintenance, and education of children of either
spouse in keeping with the economic condition of the community, the spouse is entitled to
reimbursement from the other spouse regardless of the value of that spouse's share of the
community.
18. Id. art. 2367 (West 1985) provides as follows:
If separate property of a spouse has been used for the acquisition, use, improvement, or
benefit of community property, that spouse upon termination of the community is entitled to
one-half of the amount or value that the property had at the time it was used. The liability of
the spouse who owes reimbursement is limited to the value of his share in the community after
deduction of all community obligations.
Buildings, other constructions permanently attached to the ground and plantings made
on community property with separate assets of a spouse become community property. Upon
termination of the community, the spouse whose assets were used is entitled to one-half of the
amount or value that the separate assets had at the time they were used. The liability of the
spouse who owes reimbursement is limited to the value of his share in the community after
deduction of all community obligations.
19. A similar problem of the overlap of the rule for debts into the area covered by the rule for
acquisitions and improvements exists when the community seeks reimbursement under articles 2364
(satisfaction of separate debts) and 2366 (acquisition, use, improvement, or benefit of separate property).
See C. Lawrence Orlansky, Note, Termination of the Community, 42 LA. L. REv. 789, 801-03 (1982).
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the common interest of the spouses, they are community obligations as defined
by Civil Code article 2360. If a community obligation is paid with separate
property, reimbursement is due under article 2365. The definition of community
obligation includes "an alimentary obligation imposed by law on a spouse." 2°
Thus, a spouse who owes alimony to an ex-spouse or child support to children
of a previous marriage, and who uses his or her separate funds to pay these
obligations, is entitled to reimbursement.
Furthermore, when separate funds have been used to pay obligations incurred
for the ordinary and customary expenses of the marriage or for the support,
maintenance, and education of the children of either spouse, reimbursement is
not limited to the value of the community property on hand when recovery is
ordered; the other spouse is personally obligated to pay half of the amount so
used.2 In other words, a spouse is obligated to reimburse ordinary family
expenses, whether he or she has a separate estate. In effect, a spouse with no
separate property must pay the same amount toward nonextravagant family
expenses that exceed the value of the community property out of future
(postdissolution) earnings as his or her millionaire spouse.
Had the spouses not contracted to have a community property regime, family
expenses would not be shared equally regardless of means. In a separate
property regime, in the absence of alternative provisions in the matrimonial
agreement, expenses of the marriage are shared in proportion to each spouse's
means.2 Ironically, a spouse with no separate property may be penalized by
living under a community regime with a separately wealthy spouse.
Louisiana's family expenses reimbursement rules may most poignantly affect
an unwary stepparent. Because the parent-spouse's alimentary obligation is
classified as a community obligation, the stepparent-spouse is, at partition, denied
a claim for reimbursement for community funds spent to satisfy the parent-spouse's alimentary obligation. Indirectly, then, the stepparent-spouse must pay for
the support of the children of the separately wealthy parent-spouse even though
the children may not have been living in the home with the parent and
stepparent. 23 When the amount of child support owed by the parent-spouse is
higher, due to the existence of parent-spouse's separate property, than it would
have been if based only on community income and assets, the rules operate in
an even less equitable manner.24

20.

LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2362 (West 1985).

21. Id. art. 2365. To be reimbursable, the expenses must have been in keeping with the economic
condition of the community. Id.
22. Id. art. 2373 (West 1985). See Sharpe v. Sharpe, 536 So. 2d 434, 436-38 (La. Ct. App. 1988)
(matrimonial agreement to be separate in property said "neither spouse shall have any economic claim
upon the other"; held: language precludes reimbursement for living expenses or improvements to other
spouse's property).
23. See Janet M. Riley, Stepparent's Responsibility of Support,44 LA. L. REv. 1753, 1755-61 (1984).
24. In contrast to Louisiana, California forces a spouse who has a separate income to use it to
discharge his or her alimentary obligations. CAL. CiV. CODE § 5120.150(b) (West Supp. 1992)
(community entitled to reimbursement in amount of separate income that was available but not used to
pay spouse's child or spousal support obligation).
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Even when neither spouse owes any alimentary obligations, the reimbursement rules operate unfairly where the separate estates of the spouses are
unequal. The reimbursement claim of the wealthy spouse for separate funds
spent on family expenses can exhaust the other spouse's interest in the
community property even though the substantial separate funds permitted the
community to live in excess of community means. Unless the separately wealthy
spouse is guilty of fraud or bad faith in managing the family expenses, no
defense exists to repayment of the wealthy spouse from the community
property.'
Another of Louisiana's new rules indirectly affects the fairness of allowing
the separately wealthy spouse reimbursement for family expenses. Prior to 1980,
the fruits of a spouse's separate property were classified as community property,
and the poorer spouse benefitted from these fruits. Even if separate capital was
reimbursed, the reimbursement was at least partially offset by the community's
receipt of the fruits of the separate property. While the fruits of separate
property are still presumptively classified as community property in Louisiana,
the 1980 revision gives either spouse the unilateral option to reserve as separate
the fruits of his or her separate property.2 6 However, the entitlement to
reimbursement does not depend on whether a spouse has exercised this option.
When only the wife had the right to reserve the income from her separate
property, if she did so, and if she had brought no dowry to the support of the
marriage, she was required to contribute to family expenses up to one-half of this
income under pre-1980 law.27 The law did not let her exercise a potentially
selfish option to increase her separate estate without imposing a corresponding
obligation for the benefit of the marriage.
Presently, the other spouse may not even know that the separately wealthy
spouse has exercised the option. Unlike Wisconsin, Louisiana does not require
actual notice to the other spouse.' The other spouse receives only constructive
notice through recordation of the declaration reserving the fruits. Few spouses
will systematically read the legal notices in the newspaper or periodically check
the court records to determine whether the other spouse has reserved the fruits
of his or her separate property. A spouse may think the income of the other
spouse's separate property is still community, when in fact this income had
become separate and, if used on family expenses, will generate a reimbursement
claim-a nasty surprise at the termination of the community.
Finally, article 2367 limits a reimbursement claim for separate property used
for the acquisition or improvement of community property to the value of
25. See LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2354 (West 1985). The claim for loss or damage due to
mismanagement could offset the reimbursement claim in whole or in part.
26. Id. art. 2339. The option is criticized in Dian T. Arruebarrena, Rethinking the Classificationof
Credit Acquisitions Under Louisiana's Community Property Law, 50 LA. L. REv. 973, 991 n.69 (1990).
Prior to 1980 only the wife had this right to elect separate classification of the income from separate
capital.
27. LA. CIV. CODE art. 2389 (1870).
28.

WIS. STAT. ANN.

§§

766.31(4), (7p), 766.59(2)(b) (West Supp. 1991).
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community assets at termination, while article 2365 does not so limit a
reimbursement claim for separate property used for family expenses. When a
spouse makes both claims, no rule allocates the value of the community assets
to one claim or the other if the assets are insufficient to satisfy both. If the value
of these assets is allocated first to pay the limited claim, the separate estate will
have a better chance of full reimbursement, and the other spouse will have more
debt to satisfy personally than if the value is allocated first for the unlimited
claim. The Louisiana courts have not addressed this issue, but emphasis on
equal responsibility for ordinary expenses could prompt a court to allocate the
value of the community property more favorably to the separate estate.
2 9 the community had a positive balance
In Guarisco v. Guarisco,
net of

liabilities to third parties of $193,240. The husband's $611,553 reimbursement
claim not only eliminated any interest the wife had in the community property,
but also left her owing the husband $209,156. The court stated that the
husband's separate funds had been used to retire community debts, purchase a
Mercedes auto, and pay community taxes, but did not discuss whether these
debts and expenditures were ordinary expenses of the family in keeping with the
economic condition of the community. By allowing reimbursement beyond the
value of the community assets, the court implied that these expenditures were
such ordinary family expenses. The court believed that the "unfair, if not
downright inequitable" present law compelled its decision.'
The presumption that all obligations incurred during the existence of a
community regime are community obligations a" makes it difficult for a spouse
in a Guarisco situation to defend against a reimbursement claim. The burden
appears to be on the spouse defending against the reimbursement claim to prove
that a particular obligation incurred during the community regime and paid with
separate property was not for the common interest of the spouses, for the
interest of the spouse who did not incur the obligation, or for separate property
not benefitting the community.32 Tort obligations incurred during the community regime are presumptively community obligations, and even intentional wrongs
can be community obligations if "perpetrated for the benefit of the community."'33 A spouse who embezzles from his or her employer to finance a family
trip will have a reimbursement claim at termination of the community if that
spouse uses his or her separate funds to make restitution to the employer.
In sum, Louisiana's present rules on reimbursement of family expenses are
simple: Family expenses paid for with separate property, including a spouse's

29. 526 So. 2d 1126 (La. Ct. App. 1988).
30. Id. at 1132. The wife was allowed to pay the reimbursement claim in 180 monthly installments
of $1300 each. See also Maginnis v. Maginnis, 580 So. 2d 709 (La. Ct. App. 1991) (although community
insolvent, Mrs. Maginnis owed Mr. Maginnis $16,884 for use of his separate funds to pay income taxes
and $12,443 for ordinary expenses of the marriage).
31. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2361 (West 1985).
32. See id. art. 2360 (defining community obligations). See also SpAr & HARGRAVE, supra note
16, § 7.12, at 271.
33. See LA. CIv. CODE ANN. art. 2363 (West Supp. 1992).
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alimentary obligations and even some intentional torts, are reimbursed,
sometimes without limitation to the value of the community property. The
spouses' respective separate wealth or the willingness of the claimant spouse to
contribute the fruits of his or her separate property to the community are
irrelevant.
2. Investments. The new rule of article 2367 is also simple: One spouse must
reimburse the other for separate property that "has been used for the acquisition,
use, improvement, or benefit of community property .... ,"'The measure of
reimbursement is "the value that the [separate] property had at the time it was
used."35 Reimbursement is limited to the value of the community property at
the time the community is terminated, but the obligation can exhaust the entire
community unless offset by damages due to the claimant's fraud or bad faith in
the management of the community property.
The devastating effect of an investment reimbursement claim on the other
spouse's community interest is illustrated by Cabral v. Cabral.-6 In 1979, the
husband and wife purchased as community property some land for commercial
development. The husband managed the project. He borrowed money to build
a commercial structure on the land and rented it to a lessee for a fixed rent for
thirty years. The construction of the building cost twice as much as had been
estimated, and interest rates on the loans financing the project soared in the
early 1980s, with the result that the fixed rent did not cover the interest the
couple owed on the loans pertaining to the property. To keep from losing the
property, the husband sold some of his separate property and applied the
$566,390 profit to the accumulating interest on the community project. Then the
husband and wife divorced. At the time of the partition of the community
property, the balance owed on the commercial property was $507,629 and the
appraised value, including the lease, was only $408,000. Although the husband37
admitted that he "might have been more attentive in managing the project,,
the court found a complete absence of fraud or bad faith on the husband's part
and granted him reimbursement even though the project was a loss. His
reimbursement claim totally consumed the wife's interest, not only in the project
on which the separate funds had been spent, but also in the other community
assets that had been acquired during the marriage. The court consoled the wife
by remarking that the community would have received the profits had the project
been successful, and that her debt to her husband was limited to her share of the
community property and could not be pursued against her personally since the

34.
35.
36.
37.

Id. art 2367 (West 1985).
Id.
543 So. 2d 952 (La. Ct. App. 1989).
Id. at 955.
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separate funds had been spent on an investment rather than on ordinary family
expenses.3 8
The result in Cabral is consistent with the new code articles. Once it is
proven that separate funds paid a community debt, acquired community
property, were used for community property, or benefitted or improved
community property, reimbursement is owed for the value the separate property
had at the time it was used. In a situation such as Cabral,where the separate
funds clearly were used for a community
investment, no other fact is relevant to
39
articles.
new
the
under
reimbursement
Several additional arguments justify the outcome of Cabral. Unless the
mortgages on the property were in rem mortgages, the entirety of the community
property (and Mr. Cabral personally, as well as Mrs. Cabral, if she signed the
note) was liable to the creditors of the project for repayment of the loan and
interest. If Mr. Cabral had not paid the interest with his separate funds, the
community property could have been seized by the creditor. What difference
does it make to Mrs. Cabral whether she loses her community interest to a
creditor or to her spouse? Either way it is lost. To object to this outcome is to
object to the basic idea of equal management-that either spouse acting alone
may obligate the entirety of the community property. Furthermore, if she
concurred in the acquisition of the property and in the loan to improve it, she
can hardly object to having to pay for it. She had the right to participate in the
management of the project, but instead acquiesced in her husband's sole
management. Her right to manage, unexercised by her own choice, entails equal
responsibility for the husband's decision to keep the property rather than selling
it before so much interest debt accumulated.
Such arguments are persuasive, but others advanced in response are also
compelling. First, the spouses' relationship between themselves should not have

38. At least the court of appeal reversed the trial court's denial of the wife's claim for alimony. The
trial court had refused to award her alimony after finding that she was capable of earning $600 per
month and had separate property consisting of jewelry, silver, and furs worth $120,000 plus naked
ownership of $50,000. The court of appeal awarded her $1750 per month alimony. She was 54 years
old, had two years of college, and had not held a job for thirty years. In connection with the alimony
claim, it was noted that the husband's income now included a small positive cash flow from the "loser"
community investment that now belonged to him, together with the rest of the community property, in
satisfaction of his reimbursement claim.
39. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2367 (West 1985). Proof that the target of the separate funds was
indeed a community debt or asset is still a prerequisite for reimbursement under the new articles. In
Starr v. Starr, 557 So. 2d 1026 (La. Ct. App. 1990), Mr. Starr claimed reimbursement for having used
separate funds to pay the rent for a community enterprise. In defense to his reimbursement claim, Mrs.
Starr asserted she had donated her interest in the community enterprise to Mr. Starr, and hence the rent
he paid with his separate funds was for his separate enterprise. The court held that her alleged oral
donation of her interest in the community enterprise lacked the proper form for a donation and was null.
Mr. Starr received reimbursement. See also Guttuso v. Guttuso, 540 So. 2d 1293 (La. Ct. App. 1989)
(Mrs. Guttuso denied reimbursement for separate funds paying off second mortgage on separate property
because there was no proof that borrowed proceeds were used for community benefit.), and Davezac
v. Davezac, 483 So. 2d 1197 (La. Ct. App. 1986) (Mr. Davezac denied reimbursement for separate funds
paying his business expenses, which he alleged redounded to community's benefit; some expenses were
for his personal benefit and no accurate categorization could be made.).
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to parallel the spouses' relationship to their creditors. This point is implicitly
recognized in Louisiana community property law when a reimbursement between
spouses is treated as an interest-free loan,' while a debt to be repaid to a
creditor will bear interest. The creditor has entered into a legal relationship with
a spouse solely for the purpose of making money, but a marriage is not entered
into for profit. Although both spouses risk losing everything to the creditor
when they speculate, the disparity in their separate wealth makes the risk much
greater for the spouse who has only community property. While the law does
not require creditors to show mercy toward debtors, a less strident result is
desirable when the parties are married.
The fact that Mrs. Cabral consented to the purchase of the speculative
community investment is intuitively relevant to the objective fairness of allowing
Mr. Cabral reimbursement. Consent is not, however, relevant under either code
article governing reimbursement to the separate estate. Thus, Mr. Cabral would
have been entitled to reimbursement even if he had made the speculative
investment without his wife's consent or knowledge. The consent of both
spouses is not required in Louisiana to acquire community property.41
Although it is unlikely that large real estate projects would be financed without
a mortgage, which would require both spouses' consent,42 other risky community investments, such as purchase of stock on margin, could well be made by one
spouse acting alone. Even so, the lack of a consent requirement need not have
made consent irrelevant in connection with a reimbursement claim.43
Furthermore, a spouse who makes a leveraged investment with separate
funds might try later to shift the remaining risk to the community without the
other spouse's consent by stipulating that the property would henceforth be part
of the community pursuant to article 2343.1." Once a separate-to-community
transmutation is effected, the payments that remain to be made after the
transmutation would be reimbursable if made with separate property. Although
an authentic act is required by article 2343.1 for a gratuitous transmutation such
as this, there is no explicit requirement of acceptance by the other spouse.
Article 2343.1 may imply a requirement of acceptance by the transferee-spouse
before the property and accompanying debt can be considered community when
it refers to a "transfer... to the other spouse., 45 In the case of transmutation

40. See LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2364 cmt. d (West 1985) (characterizing the "amount used"
measure of reimbursement as an "interest-free loan").
41. Id. art. 2347. In some states, purchase of community realty is a joint management transaction.
See generally Oldham, supra note 2.
42. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2347.
43. See Clarence J. Morrow, MatrimonialProperty Law in Louisiana,34 TUL. L. REv. 3, 48 (1959).
44. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2343.1 states the following:
The transfer by a spouse to the other spouse of a thing forming part of his separate property,
with the stipulation that it shall be part of the community, transforms the thing into community
property. As to both movables and immovables, a transfer by onerous title must be made in
writing and a transfer by gratuitous title must be made by authentic act.
45. Acceptance of donations is required under the general law, LA. CIv. CODE ANN. arts. 1540-50
(West 1985 & Supp. 1992), but article 2343.1 expressly governs gratuitous attempts to change separate
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by formal stipulation, the courts should infer an acceptance requirement
whenever the transferor claims that the property became community. The
opposite result would be unjust. In the case of the initial community investment
made without consent, however, the spouse against whom reimbursement is
claimed has no defense other than to seek damages for fraud or bad faith in the
management of the community property.
Even if the spouse against whom reimbursement is claimed consented to the
initial investment, that consent may be insufficient to justify reimbursement for
all management decisions made thereafter by the separately wealthy spouse
managing the investment independently. The separate wealth of the managing
spouse may enable that spouse to make management decisions, such as extending
a community risk, that the managing spouse would have been unable to make
without the other spouse's consent if the only assets available for investment had
been community. For example, Mr. Cabral did not need to consult Mrs. Cabral
before selling his separate property and applying it to the interest on the
community loan. Without separate property, he might have had to consult her
on liquidating or encumbering other community assets.' She then would have
had notice that the investment had become dubious and could have exercised her
management rights as she saw fit. Separate wealth, in effect, allows the spouse
who owns it to bypass the other spouse in the management of the community
property.
The legal authority of a spouse to prevent or alter the management decision
of the separately wealthy spouse is also relevant to the fairness of allowing
reimbursement against the less wealthy spouse. Even if a spouse knows that the
separately wealthy spouse is about to use his or her separate funds for a
community investment, the management rules seldom provide a veto to this
action.47 For example, if the separately wealthy spouse is managing a leveraged
community stock portfolio and all of the stock is registered in his or her name,
that spouse is the exclusive manager of the stock under the management rules
property into community property, and, as the more specific law, it would seem to preempt the general
law of donations. That is, whether acceptance is a part of the transmutation will be decided by
construing only the language of article 2343.1.
46. The husband would have had to involve the wife to encumber or alienate community
immovables titled in either or both names or movables titled in both names. Id. art. 2347. Although
the wife's community earnings and community income from the wife's separate property are obligated
by the husband's signature alone, Id. art. 2345 (West 1985), as a practical matter, if the creditor were
relying on the wife's community earnings and income as the basis for the decision to make or extend a
loan, the creditor would probably want the wife's signature or guaranty to obligate her personally so that
she would be less likely to dissipate the community income she controls. Since her signature would
obligate her separate property, the creditor would be protected in the event she elected to make the
future income from her separate property separate under LA. CIV. CODE ANN. article 2339.
47. The only effective way to stop the extension of the investment would be to sell the investment
before the spouse who desires to extend it can liquidate or borrow on his or her separate property to
extend the investment. Where the community investment is immovable property titled in either or both
names, or movable property titled in both names, the spouse who objects to the extension cannot sell
without the concurrence of the other spouse. See id. art. 2347. If the investment is a movable titled in
the name of the spouse who wishes to extend the investment, the objecting spouse has no authority to
sell. Id. art. 2351.
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and the other spouse is legally powerless to affect the decisions with respect to
the portfolio. Reimbursement should not be justifiable on the ground that the
spouse against whom reimbursement is claimed was an equal manager of the
community when the exception of sole and exclusive management, not the
general rule of equal management, applied to the investment for which
reimbursement is sought.
Finally, the community should be protected from loss due to management
decisions made through use of separate property but nevertheless reap gain from
such decisions because, under a community regime, the spouses' common
endeavor should be more important than a spouse's separate endeavor.' The
pro-community preference is already expressed in the community regime by the
presumption that all property possessed during the marriage is presumed to be
community.49 The Louisiana Supreme Court has stated that this preference is
based on such important social policy that the presumption can be rebutted only
by clear and convincing evidence." The general rule that classifies the fruits of
separate property as community also evidences this preference.5' Spouses who
do not wish to have a common endeavor with respect to their property are free
to adopt a regime of separation of property by matrimonial agreement. But if
they live under the legal regime of community, they are entitled to and should
expect rules that favor the common endeavor.
Louisiana's rules permitting reimbursement to the separate estate thus
neglect several factors bearing on the fairness of reimbursement: disparity in the
risk run by spouses of unequal wealth, consent, legal control and effective control
of management, and the preference implicit in the community regime for the
common endeavor over the separate endeavor. The next part will review prior
Louisiana law and the law of other jurisdictions to determine whether those
regimes consider these factors.
III
CONTINUING BENEFIT-LOUISIANA'S PRE-1980 RULE

It may seem odd to consult the pre-1980 Louisiana law, which was based
upon a sexist management scheme now thoroughly discredited. However, the
rules may elucidate certain aspects of the relationship between the spouses under
sex-neutral management rules. Rules developed for a system where one spouse
had sole and exclusive management are not irrelevant to an equal management

48. See Susan Prager, The Persistence of Separate Property Concepts in California's Community
Property System, 1849-1975, 24 UCLA L. REv. 1, 7 (1976)("[A] community property law makes the
assumption that common ownership is highly desirable, preferring and encouraging community, instead
of separate, ownership.").
49. LA. CIv. CODE ANN. art. 2340 (West 1985).
50. Succession of Lyons, 452 So. 2d 1161 (La. 1984) (dictum). The Civil Code, however, does not
suggest a standard of proof higher than preponderance of the evidence. See LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art.
2340.
51. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2339.
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system. Devices employed to protect the community against single-spouse
management might be even more useful when there are two independent
managers. Furthermore, though the present general rule gives the spouses equal
legal authority to manage, it does not necessarily follow that reimbursement rules
could not consider unequal management in fact. Some reimbursement claims
even involve situations where the spouse claiming reimbursement was legally the
exclusive manager under one of the exceptions to equal management.
Under the old law, the rules concerning restoration of the separate estate at
termination of the community were created almost entirely through judicial
opinions. Neither tracing nor reimbursement found comprehensive expression
in the Civil Code.52 Unconstrained by code articles mandating reimbursement,
the courts made rules intended more to protect the nonmanaging spouse's
community interest than to restore the managing spouse's separate estate.
A marriage in which the managing spouse had separate property presented
first the problem of manipulation. A managing spouse who controlled both his
or her own separate funds and community funds, and who also controlled the
obligations satisfiable out of community property, was in a position to manipulate
a profit or loss between the two estates for any acquisition, improvement, or
expenditure. The managing spouse might, for example, have used all of his or
her separate funds to finance unsuccessful investments he or she planned to
claim as separately owned if successful. Later, by claiming he or she had used
the separate funds for community purposes (that is, seeking a community gain),
the managing spouse could seek reimbursement from the community, indirectly
recouping personal losses from the community. To protect the nonmanaging
spouse from this kind of manipulation, the law refused the managing spouse a
presumption that he or she had used the separate property for the benefit of the
community; instead, when the managing spouse claimed reimbursement of his or
her separate funds, the law required the managing spouse to prove not only the
existence of the separate
funds, but also that they had been used for the benefit
53
of the community.

52. Although the jurisprudence permitted ownership tracing of separate funds in some instances,
it was not until an amendment in 1912 to LA. CIV. CODE art. 2334 (1870) that the code expressly
recognized that acquisitions with separate funds were separate property. See Robert A. Pascal, Work
of the Appellate Courts -- 1968-1969, 30 LA. L. REv. 219, 223-25 (1969). The Louisiana Civil Code of
1870 never contained any articles concerning reimbursement of the husband's separate estate, but the
jurisprudence recognized the right. See LA. CIV. CODE ANN. arts. 2365 cmt. c, 2366 cmt. c.
LA. CIV. CODE art. 2391 (1870) gave the wife the right to restitution of her paraphernal property
(that is, nondotal separate property), and article 2403 (1870) provided a rule for the charging of
antenuptial debts to separate property and debts contracted during the marriage to community property.
Both of the articles were repealed. Those were the only articles aside from the articles on dowry that
were relevant to separate claims to reimbursement. The code was equally cryptic concerning community
claims to reimbursement. In addition to article 2403 concerning debts, there was only article 2408, which
gave the community the right to claim the value of the increase in separate property due to the common
labor of the spouses. The old code articles were never satisfactory in any of these areas of law. See
Robert A. Pascal, Work of the Appellate Courts -- 1975-1976: MatrimonialRegimes, 37 LA. L. REv. 358,
365 (1977) [hereinafter Matrimonial Regimes].
53. Huie, supra note 1, at 166-67.
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Originally, the requirement placed on the manager to prove that a

community benefit resulted from the expenditure of the manager's separate
funds was addressed to the manipulation problem. It was intended to make the
manager show that his or her separate funds went to a community, rather than
a separate, purpose. But a line of decisions went further, holding that past
benefit to the community was not enough to justify reimbursement; the benefit
to the community must still exist at termination of the community 4
Under this "continuing benefit rule," the managing spouse had an almost
insurmountable burden of persuasion to win reimbursement when he or she had
commingled separate funds with community funds, or when separate funds had
been spent on family living expenses from which no particular benefit existed at
termination." Without evidence linking separate funds directly to a particular
community asset or benefit still in existence at termination, the reimbursement
claim would be rejected. Purporting to apply this rule, one appellate court
allowed a reimbursement claim to succeed where the court was completely

convinced that the manager was successful in business, suffered no business
reversals, and was never in debt, and the community investments had increased
beyond the amount
by which they would have grown without the investment of
56
separate funds.

The line of cases requiring that the benefit to the community continue until
termination addressed not only the manipulation question of where the
husband's separate funds had gone, but also served as a final judicial check on
the performance of the managing spouse. That spouse's entitlement to
reimbursement depended upon whether the separate funds had produced any
lasting good for the community in the form of property to be divided at
termination. Thus, in a case where the husband's separate funds had paid the
note on the community Chevrolet, which the spouses no longer owned at
dissolution, no reimbursement was allowed. 57 The Louisiana Supreme Court
sometimes defined the continuing benefit requirement as an "enhancement of the
community at its dissolution. 5 ' The requirement had the effect of subordinat-

54. Id. at 176-89. See also Succession of Provost, 181 So. 802 (La. 1938); Succession of Ferguson,
84 So. 338 (La. 1920); Munchow v. Munchow, 67 So. 819 (La. 1915); Heirs of Gee v. Thompson, 6 So.
548 (La. 1889) (seminal cases for the continuing benefit requirement).
55. Succession of Turgeau, 58 So. 497 (La. 1912) (denying wife reimbursement for separate funds
spent on living expenses when husband was ill and impecunious). See also Succession of Dutin, 149 So.
363 (La. 1933). But see Mier v. Troxler, 235 So. 2d 170 (La. Ct. App. 1970); Heirs of Gee v. Thompson,
6 So. 548 (La. 1889) (denying the husband reimbursement for a pleasure trip taken by both spouses).
56. Succession of Videau, 197 So. 2d 655 (La. Ct. App. 1967).
57. Gouaux v. Gouaux, 211 So. 2d 97, 102-03 (La. Ct. App. 1968). No evidence of a trade-in was
presented. Presumably the Chevrolet was wrecked or sold and its proceeds consumed so as not to be
traceable to a benefit existing at dissolution.
58. Abunza v. Olivier, 88 So. 2d 815, 821 (La. 1956). See also Succession of Russo, 246 So. 2d 26,
30 (La. Ct. App. 1971) (holding that funds must inure to the benefit of community); Paxton v. Bramlette,
228 So. 2d 161, 166 (La. Ct. App. 1969) (entitling husband to restitution only where his separate funds
have enhanced the value of community); Broyles v. Broyles, 215 So. 2d 526, 528 (La. Ct. App. 1968)
(requiring husband to demonstrate that his separate funds increased the value of community).
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ing the goal of restoring the manager's separate property to the goal of
protecting the community property until termination.
The "enhancement at dissolution" rule was not without its critics. Professor
Huie thought it made a reimbursement claim too difficult to prove; it often
relegated the husband to ownership-tracing as the only means of restoring his
separate capital. 59 He also criticized the rule because it allocated the risk of
capital loss on a community investment to the separate estate. He reasoned that
capital loss should fall on the estate that was sought to be improved or
benefitted.' According to Huie, family living expenses should be borne by the
community, and the separate estate should be reimbursed for having enriched
the community by paying them.61 While he acknowledged that the motive for
the enhancement-at-dissolution rule was the courts' commendable desire to
protect the nonmanaging spouse, he objected to "judicial review" of the
manager's actions, pointing out that the requirement of continued enhancement
was inconsistent with the manager's broad power to manage the community.
Since the manager was liable only for losses to community property due to his
fraud, his reimbursement from the community should be denied only in cases of
fraud.62 Huie believed that maintaining reimbursement as a viable way to
restore separate capital was more important than having an additional legal tool
to control mismanagement.' Despite Huie's criticism, the decisions rendered
after publication of his articles persisted in holding that for the manager
successfully to claim reimbursement, the benefit to the community had to exist
at termination. 64

59. Huie, supra note 1, at 144.
60. Id. at 188-89.
61. Id. at 159. Arguably, reimbursement of living expenses, a kind of debt contracted during the
marriage, was mandated by Louisiana Civil Code article 2403 of 1870.
62. See Huie, supra note 1, at 197-205. Prior to 1980, the husband was liable, with respect to his
management, to the wife or her heirs only for fraudulently disposing of the community property. He
could make donations of individual community movables without his wife's consent. See LA. CIv. CODE
art. 2404 (1870). Huie did think that the law should have been amended to require the wife's consent
to donations, Huie, supra note 1, at 210, and suggested broadening the remedy of separation of property
if protection for the wife in cases of the husband's extravagance was desired, id at 200.
63. Huie, supra note 1, at 199-200, 204 (arguing that reimbursement should be allowed even for
extravagant expenses by the husband even if the wife's interest in the community would be extinguished).
Huie suggested broadening the separation of property remedy as a preferable way to protect the wife.
See LA. CIV. CODE art. 2425 (1870), now LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art 2374 (West 1985).

64. See Abunza, 88 So. 2d 815; Messersmith v. Messersmith, 86 So. 2d 169 (La. 1956); Compton v.
Compton, 371 So. 2d 313 (La. Ct. App. 1979); Lane v. Lane, 375 So. 2d 660, 674-75 (La. Ct. App. 1978);
Gouaux, 211 So. 2d 97; Succession of Videau, 197 So. 2d 655; Pennison v. Pennison, 157 So. 2d 628 (La.
Ct. App. 1963) (alternate holding denied the husband's claim for reimbursement for community's use
of his separate home because such use involved no enhancement of the community existing at
dissolution). The enhancement at dissolution rule appeared in dicta in Slater v. Culpepper, 99 So. 2d 348,
360 (La. 1957), Turner v. Turner, 533 So. 2d 31, 33 (La. Ct. App. 1988) (pre-1980 law), and Downs v.
Downs, 410 So. 2d 793 (La. Ct. App. 1982) (same). Paxton, 228 So. 2d at 166, stated that the husband
must show "that his funds have been employed to enhance the value of the community property," and
cited the above line of cases as authority. Succession of Russo imposed the enhancement standard for
reimbursement on a wife by denying her reimbursement for the separate funds she deposited in a
community account because the benefit to the community was not of "such a nature as to give the
community a strong and substantial economic advantage." 246 So. 2d at 30.
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Finally, the pre-1980 law on the measure of reimbursement tended to favor
the community over full restoration of the separate estate. When separate funds
were used to acquire an asset that was classified as community property because
of the rules forbidding tracing, the spouse was reimbursed the amount spent.'
But when separate funds were used to improve a community asset, the courts
were split, some awarding the amount spent, others limiting reimbursement to
the amount by which the community property had been enhanced at dissolution.' Although there were few cases involving the measure of reimbursement
to the separate estate in improvement situations, it seems to have been assumed
by the bar that the numerous cases applying the enhancement limitation to
community claims for reimbursement applied equally to separate claims for
reimbursement. 67 Indeed, the drafters of the 1980 changes in the law stated
that under the old law, when reimbursement was sought by the separate estate
because the community property had increased in value, the measure of
reimbursement was "enhanced value."' Professor Huie protested that the rule
limiting reimbursement to enhanced value at dissolution, even though the
amount spent was greater, defeated restoration of the separate estate. He
argued that the community, as owner of the improved property, should have the
risk of loss as well as the opportunity for gain. As beneficiary of the fruits and
revenues of the separate property, the community also should compensate the
separate estate for both depreciation due to use and depreciation due to market
forces. The community should thus repay the separate estate the amount spent
without regard to enhanced value existing at dissolution.69 Again, his arguments seem not to have influenced courts. The courts probably believed it unfair
to give primacy to the restoration of the managing spouse's separate estate.
To summarize, the law on restoration of the separate estate prior to 1980,
almost entirely judge-made, was fashioned to do justice to the nonmanaging
spouse by protecting the community more than to restore the separate estate of
the managing spouse. The courts accomplished this by making it difficult for the
managing spouse to prove entitlement to reimbursement unless the community
still prospered at termination, and by limiting the amount of reimbursement in
improvements cases to the amount of enhancement existing at dissolution (not
to exceed amount spent). Critics argued that this state of the law was
inconsistent with a ganancial system, inadequately serving the goal of separate
estate restoration. If the goal of restoring the separate estate had been accepted
as paramount, the argument would have been compelling. But the courts denied

65. Huie, supra note 1, at 212.
66. Id. at 212-14. See Pascal, MatrimonialRegimes, supra note 52, at 372-73 (stating that the proper
measure of restitution to the separate estate under equitable principles was the value of the improvement
as it stood at dissolution of the regime, not the amount spent on the improvement).
67. Huie, supra note 1, at 214.
68. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2365 cmt. c (West 1985).
69. Huie, supra note 1, at 212-17. He also thought that use of the enhancement measure would
involve "valuation problems of considerable difficulty." Id at 217.
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the primacy of this goal and persisted in protecting the interest of the nonmanaging spouse in the community property.
The 1980 code articles did not codify the jurisprudential rule that the benefit
to the community must still exist at termination of the community regime in
order for the separate estate to be reimbursed. Yet some cases decided under
the 1980 code articles refer to community benefit as the key to reimbursement
as if the revisions included such a provision. In Succession of Davis," even
though the trial court found that the commingled funds were used by the
community, the appellate court did not allow reimbursement. The court of
appeal held: "In order to claim reimbursement [successfully] for separate funds
allegedly expended in satisfaction of community obligations or to benefit the
community, a spouse ...must show that the funds were actually used to benefit
the community."7 1 Some of these cases even cite pre-1980 jurisprudence as

authority. In Succession of Blythe,' the daughter of the deceased husband
claimed reimbursement totaling $168,468 from a community valued at $148,900.
She presented evidence that her father had derived the separate funds from the
sale of his separate property, and that since the community earnings were only
$6000 a year, his separate property had to have benefited the community either

by buying the community assets or by paying the living expenses. Citing cases
decided under pre-1980 law requiring "compelling proof that a strong and
substantial economic advantage inured to the community," the court denied the
daughter's claim.73 Since it is clear under the 1980 civil code articles that the

separate estate may be reimbursed for living expenses, and that "use" of separate
funds on community property independent of "benefit" will entitle the separate
estate to reimbursement, the court should have granted the daughter's claim if
it believed her evidence (and no evidence was offered indicating separate use of

70. 536 So. 2d 498 (La. Ct. App. 1988).
71. Id. at 501-02. The court of appeal remanded for further proof of community benefit. Contrary
to the cases emphasizing benefit, a case involving livestock applied a less stringent reimbursement rule
of pre-1980 law for livestock: unless the entire commingled herd has died, the spouse who contributed
separate livestock to a commingled herd is entitled to reimbursement in kind of the original number of
separate animals without showing what happened to each separately owned animal. Succession of
Erbelding, 509 So. 2d 568, 571 (La. Ct. App. 1987). Thus, if the husband uses his separate funds to buy
five bulls at $5000 each for the community herd, no further proof is needed to entitle him to
reimbursement in kind of animals worth $25,000 (provided the entire herd has not died). If, instead, he
had bought five blocks of common stock for $5000 each and added them to a community portfolio, he
would be required to show that there was no loss on each of these investments.
72. 496 So. 2d 1180 (La. Ct. App. 1986) (citing Succession of Vice, 385 So. 2d 554 (La. Ct. App.
1980), Succession of Videau, 197 So. 2d 655, and Succession of Russo, 246 So. 2d 26).
73. 496 So. 2d at 1183. For additional cases (decided after the 1980 codal revisions) stressing proof
of community benefit and citing old jurisprudence, see Landwehr v. Landwehr, 547 So. 2d 752 (La. Ct.
App. 1989); Kaplan v. Kaplan, 522 So. 2d 1344 (La. Ct. App. 1988); Patterson v. Patterson, 417 So. 2d
419 (La. Ct. App. 1982). Possibly consistent with these cases is the cryptic holding in Mexic v. Mexic,
577 So. 2d 1046 (La. Ct. App. 1991), which denied Mr. Mexic reimbursement for (presumably) separate
funds spent on (presumably) community property in an attempt to avoid an investment tax recapture.
The court simply said that Mr. Mexic had no obligation to make the payment and thus was not entitled
to reimbursement. Id. at 1052.
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the separate property), rather than insisting on proof of "strong and substantial
economic advantage" to the community.
As was true before 1980, the courts applying the 1980 code articles find proof
of sufficient economic advantage to the community when the reimbursement
claim does not obliterate the community property. Thus, in Ziegler v. Ziegler,74
the court found compelling proof of community benefit and allowed the
husband's reimbursement claim for $53,240. Since community earnings in the
relevant years had been meager in comparison to the husband's separate funds,
the court accepted the inference that his separate funds had to have been spent
on the community mortgage and the construction of a community house. In
Ziegler, a total community of $1,376,871 existed for the spouses to divide; the
community had prospered overall, and payment of the reimbursement claim
would still have left a considerable community interest for the other spouse.
What distinguishes Davis, Blythe, and Ziegler, with their emphasis on benefit,
from Cabraland Guarisco is the fact that funds were commingled or not directly

traceable in the former group of cases, whereas in the latter cases, separate funds
were proven to have been spent on a particular community project or debt. The
1980 code articles, however, do not prohibit reimbursement where funds are
commingled. As long as it is proved that the commingled funds were spent for
community investments or family expenses, any separate funds within the
commingled funds spent are apparently reimbursable under the 1980 articles."
The purposes served by the courts' references to community benefit or strong

and substantial economic advantage are to allow for proof that the commingled
funds (and the separate funds within) may have been lost on bad investments,
and to deny reimbursement in such cases. This interpretation of the 1980

74. 537 So. 2d 1207 (La. Ct. App. 1989).
75. See Young v. Young, 549 So. 2d 437 (La. Ct. App. 1989). In Young, a permanently disabled
husband and his wife lived off his Social Security disability benefits and her $800 to $1000 per month
wages. Mr. Young purchased real estate and a tractor from an account containing his considerable
separate property personal injury recovery, and meager community funds. The court held that the
purchases were community, but that Mr. Young was entitled to reimbursement of the purchase price.
The purchases had been made with cash, and there was not enough community income at the time of
each purchase to have produced all the cash. The record showed it was "virtually impossible for these
community advantages to be gained without [Mr. Young's] separate funds." Id. at 441. See also
Thibodaux v. Thibodaux, 577 So. 2d 758 (La. Ct. App. 1991) (Mr. Thibodaux denied reimbursement
where he commingled proceeds of sale of separate property with community funds, but any benefit to
community from commingling offset community claim for reimbursement for mortgage payments and
improvements made on the property prior to sale).
In the following cases, commingling prevented tracing, but the argument that the commingled
funds (including the separate funds within) were spent in such a way as to entitle the spouse whose
separate funds were used to reimbursement was not mentioned: Hinckley v. Hinckley, 583 So. 2d 125
(La. Ct. App. 1991) (reimbursement allowed for separate property traced to community immovable, but
reimbursement issue not raised concerning commingled stock portfolio); Cason v. Cason, 564 So. 2d 808
(La. Ct. App. 1990) (commingled personal injury award); Martinez v. Martinez, 556 So. 2d 668 (La. Ct.
App 1990) (commingled stock account); Breaux v. Breaux, 555 So. 2d 1001 (La. Ct. App. 1990) (Mr.
Breaux failed to prove original amount of separate stock in one company, but court held his separate
shares in whatever amount were inextricably commingled with community shares in that company;
therefore, all shares were community).
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articles, though commendable for the protection it affords the community, calls
for proof of facts beyond those required by the code articles for reimbursement.
IV
No REIMBURSEMENT FOR FAMILY EXPENSES; LIMITED REIMBURSEMENT
FOR INVESTMENTS: CALIFORNIA LAW
A comparison of Louisiana's rules on restoration of the separate estate to
those of California is helpful for several reasons. California, like Louisiana,
requires an equal division of the community property at termination of the
regime, and does not permit the court to divide separate property.76 Since the
courts, at least in theory, have no discretion to do justice by means of an unequal
division of community property or by awarding one spouse some of the separate
property of the other, both states should have rules on restoration of the
separate estate carefully thought out to insure fairness. California, like
Louisiana, codified some of its rules concerning restoration of separate property
in the 1980s. Both states have equal management as the general rule of
management. Of the differences between the community property regimes of
the two states, the most important is the following: In California, the fruits and
revenues of separate property are separate, while in Louisiana they are
community unless the spouse who owns the separate property formally declares
the fruits to be separate.
Prior to the 1980s, California's rules were, as were Louisiana's, largely
judge-made. But the California courts had in one respect gone further than
Louisiana in protecting the community property from claims for restoration of
the separate estate. In the landmark 1966 California case of See v. See,77 the
husband, who sought to trace his separate funds to assets remaining at
dissolution, argued that since family expenses during the marriage had exceeded
community income during the marriage, all the community income should be
imputed to those expenses; consequently, he argued, the remaining assets should
be attributed to his separate funds. The California Supreme Court rejected the
husband's theory, known as tracing by "total recapitulation," because the theory
implicitly reimbursed the husband for any separate funds that were spent on
living expenses. Such reimbursement was contrary to California's rule that a
spouse who uses separate funds for living expenses has made a gift of those
funds and cannot claim reimbursement absent an agreement. One justification
by the court for the no-reimbursement rule was that the use of separate property
enabled the family to maintain a standard of living beyond the community
means, and thus reimbursement would be unfair when claimed by the manager

76. CAL. CIV. CODE § 4800 (West Supp. 1992); LA. Civ. CODE ANN. art. 2336 (West 1985); LA.
REv. STAT. ANN. § 2801 (West 1991).

77.

415 P.2d 776 (Cal. 1966).

Page 273: Spring 1993] LOUISIANA'S REIMBURSEMENT RULES
of the community.7"

The change to equal management in California has not

dislodged the no-reimbursement rule.7 9
In Marriage of Lucas,' the California Supreme Court extended the
no-reimbursement rule from the "total recapitulation" context to the context of
an investment acquisition. It refused to allow a wife who had used her separate
funds as the downpayment on immovable property during marriage, title to
which was taken in both names, either to trace or to claim reimbursement. The
court said that while the spouses were living together, "unless an agreement
between the parties specifies that the contributing party be reimbursed, a party
who utilizes his separate property for community purposes intends a gift to the
community."'" The California Supreme Court later stated that it regarded this
rule as having been well established for more than twenty years.'
After the Lucas decision, the legislature enacted civil code section 4800.2 as
an exception to the no-reimbursement rule.' Although it allows reimbursement
in investment cases, it contains safeguards for the community. Section 4800.2,
applicable to the division of community property at divorce or legal separation,' provides that a spouse shall be reimbursed for separate contributions to
the acquisition of community property unless he or she has waived the right in

78. See v. See did permit a limited use of the inference that community income was spent on family
expenses: to show that no community funds were available at a particular point in time. Id. at 780.
Even this limited inference is criticized in Ralph Ehrenpries, Comment, Community Property:
Commingled Accounts and the Family-Expenses Presumption, 19 STAN. L. REv. 661 (1967). In a case
where all income during the marriage is separate, California permits the spouse who used separate
income to pay family expenses to offset this amount against the community's claim for the gain on his
other separate property due to his or her labor. Beam v. Bank of America, 490 P.2d 257 (Cal. 1971).
79. See Marriage of Epstein, 592 P.2d 1165 (Cal. 1979). The laws of the various community
property states differ concerning reimbursement of family expenses. See WILLIAM A. REPPY &
CYNTHIA SAMUEL, COMMUNITY PROPERTY IN THE UNITED STATES 10-7 (3d ed. 1991) (noting that

Idaho and Arizona have used total recapitulation accounting, which presumes reimbursement for living
expenses; that Texas cases are inconsistent on whether there can be reimbursement for living expenses,
and that recent New Mexico cases deny such reimbursement). New Mexico, like California and
Louisiana, requires an equal division of the community property. Michelson v. Michelson, 520 P.2d 263
(N.M. 1974). Thus, of the three equal division states, two do not allow reimbursement for family
expenses.
80. 614 P. 2d 285 (Cal. 1980).
81. Id. at 289 (quoting Marriageof Epstein, 592 P.2d at 1169). The property in Lucas was a joint
tenancy, but was presumed to be community under a special California rule pertaining to divorce. See
CAL. CIV. CODE § 4800.1 (West Supp. 1993).
82. Marriage of Fabian, 715 P. 2d 253, 256 (Cal. 1986). Marriage of Epstein had created an
exception to the no-reimbursement rule where expenditures of separate funds on former community
property were made after the spouses were no longer living together. 592 P.2d at 1169. Nevertheless,
under the Epstein exception, reimbursement was not always for the amount paid. The court took into
account whether the expenditure enhanced the property and whether reimbursement for the amount paid
would eliminate the community's equity in the property. Marriage of Reilley, 242 Cal. Rptr. 302 (Ct.
App. 1987).
83. Act to Amend the Civil Code relating to property ch. 342, § 1, 1983 Cal. Stat. 1538.
84. The Lucas rule of no tracing and no reimbursement for separate funds that increase the equity
in a community investment is applicable when the community is dissolved by the death of a spouse.
There seems to be no reason why the reimbursement rule of California Civil Code § 4800.2 should not
apply to dissolution at death, as well as divorce and judicial separation. Since in these kinds of
dissolution equal division of the community is required, what purpose is served by having different
reimbursement rules depending on which event dissolves the community regime?
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writing. Contributions include downpayments, payments for improvements, and
payments that reduce the principal of a loan used to finance the purchase or
improvement of the community property. The protection for the community lies
in section 4800.2's measure of reimbursement: the amount reimbursed shall be
without interest or adjustment for change in monetary values, and shall not
exceed the net value of the property at the time of the division. Furthermore,
reimbursable separate contributions do not include payments of interest on the
loan used to finance the purchase or improvement, or payments made for
maintenance, insurance, or taxes on the property.8
Under section 4800.2, the wife in the Louisiana Cabralcase would have fared
much better.' Her husband's reimbursement claim could not have included the
interest payments he allowed to accumulate, nor could his reimbursement claim
have extended beyond the net value of the particular property that the payments
were used to acquire or improve. The rest of the community property would
have been preserved for the division. Had the community in Cabralterminated
at death, under California's Lucas decision Mr. Cabral's heirs would have been
denied any reimbursement. Had Louisiana's Guariscocase been decided under
See v. See, living expenses would not have been reimbursable at all, and there
might have been community property left to divide.
Even if California's reimbursement rules did not effectively protect the
community, the duties California imposes on a spouse in managing the
community may perform a similar function. Civil Code section 5125, as amended
in 1991, imposes the "general rules governing fiduciary relationships which
control the actions of persons having relationships of personal confidence" upon
a spouse who is managing community property.87 This statute places a duty of
"the highest good faith and fair dealing on each spouse," and admonishes that
"neither shall take unfair advantage of the other."'
The high standard of
conduct required of a spouse would enable a court to protect the community
from any manipulation and speculation, and possibly also serious negligence of
the spouse claiming reimbursement of his or her separate property. 9 The

85. California Civil Code § 4800.2 has been held not to apply when after separation a spouse uses
his salary, now separate under California Civil Code § 5118, to pay a mortgage debt on community
property incurred prior to separation. In that situation, the court has discretion to allow reimbursement
under Marriage of Epstein, 592 P.2d 1165, which displaces Lucas as the controlling case, despite the
limitations of § 4800.2. Green v. Green, 261 Cal. Rptr. 294 (1989); Hebring v. Hebring, 255 Cal. Rptr.
488 (1989).

Other California statutory provisions dealing with specific instances of reimbursement are CAL.

CIV. CODE §§ 5120.140 (West Supp. 1992) (reimbursement of separate estate for payment of debt for

necessaries of life incurred by one spouse if community property or separate property of other spouse
was available), 5120.150 (reimbursement of community for payment of a spouse's child or spousal
support obligation to extent spouse owing support had separate income), and 5120.160 (reimbursement
after division). These three provisions have a special measure of reimbursement and time limit for
exercise. Id. § 5120,210.
86. See supra text accompanying notes 36-38.
87.

CAL. CIV. CODE § 5103 (West Supp. 1992).

88.
89.

Id.
See generally, Oldham, supra note 2 (discussing California's new duty of care).
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California standard would certainly justify greater court scrutiny of reimbursement claims than does Louisiana's fraud or bad faith standard.
V
SUBSISTING PROFIT, NECESSITY, BENEFIT: THE RULES OF FRANCE

In France, the rules of the legal community regime,' as modified in 1985,
provide a general rule for the equal and independent management and
disposition of the community property by each spouse, the spouses being liable
to each other for "fault." 91 Each spouse also has the right to manage and
dispose of his or her separate property 2 and to consume its fruits, but savings
from the fruits and acquisitions made from savings are community property.93
The concept of equal and independent management was superimposed in
1985 on the existing reimbursement rules that incorporated the principle that one
estate must not gain at the expense of the other. This unjust enrichment
principle is expressed in a general rule that reimbursement, whether communityto-separate or separate-to-community, is the lesser of the amount spent or the
profit subsisting at partition.'
Subsisting profit, where acquisitions are
concerned, means an amount equal to a pro-rata share of the present value of
the property;9 5 for improvements, subsisting profit is the difference between the
value of the property at partition and the value it would have had if the
improvement had not been made.' For expenses of preservation, scholarly
authority exists for both methods of calculating subsisting profit.' There are
two exceptions to the general rule reimbursing the lesser of the amount spent or
subsisting profit: reimbursement for necessary expenses cannot be less than the
amount spent; and reimbursement for the acquisition, preservation, and
improvement of property cannot be less than the amount of the subsisting
profit.9
Necessary expenses, according to some authorities, extend beyond

90. In France, the "legal regime of the community reduced to acquets" is the regime that applies
to the spouses who have married without adopting a matrimonial regime by formal marriage contract.
See ANDRP COLOMER, DROIT CIVIL, REGIMES MATRIMONIAUX no. 3 (4th ed. 1990). It corresponds
generally to the legal regime of acquets and gains of Louisiana, though the two differ in some respects.
See LA. CIV. CODE ANN. arts. 2327-28 (West 1985).

91. C. CIV. art. 1421 (Fr.). "Fault" probably will be limited to serious faults. COLOMER, supra note
90, at no. 500.
92. C. cIv. art. 1428 (Fr.).
93. C. CIV. arts. 1401, 1403 (Fr.). The community is due reimbursement if during the five years
prior to dissolution a spouse neglected to collect the fruits of his or her separate property or fraudulently
consumed them. C. cIv. art. 1403 (Fr.). See COLOMER, supra note 90, at nos. 609-11.
94. C. civ. art. 1469 (Fr.).
95. COLOMER, supra note 90. If the property has been disposed of before partition, subsisting profit
is calculated as of the day it was alienated; if proceeds have been invested in a new asset, it is calculated
based on value added to the new asset. C. cIv. art. 1469 (Fr.).
96. COLOMER, supra note 90, at no. 987.
97. Id. at no. 984.
98. C. civ. art. 1469 (Fr.); COLOMER, supra note 90, at No. 967-68.
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those incurred to preserve an immovable to any expense vital to person or
patrimony? 9 Payment of mortgage debt-presumably including the interest
component-to secure the purchase, preservation, or improvement of property
is probably treated under the rules for acquisitions, preservation, and improvements.1" Furthermore, although family expenses are community debts, and a
spouse who pays a family expense with separate funds is generally entitled to
reimbursement, the court may deny reimbursement if the expense did not benefit
the community because, for example, it was excessive, or because one spouse
made a selfish purchase without consent.1 1 Should the community be
exhausted, however, each spouse is obligated to contribute to family expenses in
proportion to his or her meansl'°

Had Cabralbeen decided under French rules, the husband's reimbursement
claim would have been limited to the community project's subsisting profit, a fair
result since the husband admitted he should have paid more attention to the
project he undertook to manage. Family expenses in France are reimbursable,
but they are scrutinized for actual community necessity and benefit to prevent
extravagances or the selfish desires of a spouse from eroding the community.
Such a rule in Louisiana might have reduced the reimbursement claim in
Guarisco by making the court scrutinize more carefully the community debts
paid with separate property. In France, independence in management during the
regime is tempered at dissolution by reimbursement rules that, when applied to
separate claims for reimbursement for unsuccessful investments, will make the
separate estate bear some of the loss. The measure of reimbursement for
investments-the limitation of subsisting profit-is the mechanism for doing so;
for family expenses, it is the circumstances entitling a spouse to reimbursement
-necessity and community benefit-that reconcile the individual and common
interests.
VI
ENHANCED VALUE, NECESSITY, FAULT:
LouISIANA's NEW CO-OWNERSHIP LAW

In Louisiana, the partition of the community often occurs many months after
the termination of the community regime by divorce or death. During the time
after the regime is terminated but before the community patrimony is partitioned, one of the spouses will commonly use his or her now separate earnings

99. G. CORNU, LES REGIMES MATRIMONIAUX 577 (5th ed. 1989). For example, a surgical
operation or the purchase of tools for a spouse's profession are necessary expenses in the view of some
French authorities. COLOMER, supra note 90, at no. 971.
100. See COLOMER, supra note 90, at no. 985. Payment of a mortgage debt incurred for a purpose
other than acquisition, preservation, or improvement of the mortgaged property would be reimbursed
depending on whether the debt was "necessary." The payment is not treated as preserving the property
simply because it prevents foreclosure.
101. Id. at no. 795-96.
102. C. CIV. art. 214 (Fr.).
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to pay former community debts. The Civil Code's reimbursement rules
previously discussed in this article appear to apply only to expenditures during
the community regime. Nevertheless, prior to 1991 the Louisiana courts had
been applying them to expenditures after termination of the regime. Some
courts, however, exercised more freedom to consider equitable factors in the
post-termination situation than the code articles allow. 3
The matrimonial regime's rules on reimbursement are no longer applicable
to post-termination situations. Instead, article 2369.1, added to the Civil Code
in 1990, effective January 1, 1991, states: "After termination of the community
property regime, the provisions governing co-ownership apply unless there is
contrary provision of law or juridical act. '' 1"4 The official comment states:
"After termination of the community, the interests of the former spouses in
anything held in indivision are treated as co-ownership."1 5 Thus, to the extent
that the rules of co-ownership address reimbursement, these rules, not the rules
of the matrimonial regime, would determine whether and to what extent
reimbursement would be allowed for post-termination expenditures.
Effective in 1991, the Civil Code acquired new rules on ownership in
indivision (also called co-ownership)."
When one co-owner uses personal
funds for the property owned in common, issues arise similar to those raised
when a spouse uses separate property for a community acquisition or improvement."' 7 The new co-ownership rules can thus be compared to the reimbursement rules concerning acquisitions and improvements. The new co-ownership
rules specify two instances in which a co-owner is entitled to reimbursement:
when substantial alterations or improvements of the co-owned property have
been made by one of the co-owners;" and when expenses have been incurred
by one of the co-owners in connection with the property."
Unlike the reimbursement rules of the community regime, entitlement to
reimbursement for substantial alterations or improvements considers whether the
alteration or improvement was made with the consent of the other co-owner and,
if not, whether the construction was consistent with the use of the property.
When an alteration or improvement is made with the consent of the co-owner,
or is made without the consent of the co-owner but is consistent with the use of

103. See SPAHT & HARGRAVE, supra note 16, § 7.14, at 289-91. In the post-termination setting two
issues had arisen: (1) whether to permit reimbursement of the full amount of a mortgage payment made
on the former community residence (now held in indivision), or only for the principle paid, the
reimbursement for interest, taxes, and insurance depending on which spouse had the obligation to
provide housing for the occupying spouse, id. at notes 3847; and (2) whether to deny reimbursement
for payments made on a former community auto when the spouse making-the payments had exclusive
use of the auto since termination of the community. Id. at nn. 48-50.
104. LA. Civ. CODE ANN. art. 2369.1 (West Supp. 1992).
105. Id. cmt.
106. Id. arts. 797-818, added by 1990 LA. ACTS 990, effective Jan. 1, 1991.
107. Nothing in the co-ownership situation corresponds, however, to use of separate property for
family expenses.
108. Id. art. 804.
109. Id. art. 806.
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the property, reimbursement pursuant to the new co-ownership rules is the least
of the following: the cost of the materials, their current value, or the enhanced
value of the immovable at the time reimbursement is sought. n
If the
alteration or improvement was made despite the objection of the other co-owner,
or is inconsistent with the use of the property, that co-owner may demand its
removal at the expense of the co-owner who made the alteration or improvement, or reimburse the co-owner who made the alteration or improvement for
the current value of the materials and workmanship or the enhanced value of the
immovable at the time reimbursement is sought, whichever is less."' Thus,
under the new rules of co-ownership, reimbursement is always limited to
enhanced value and may be completely unavailable in some circumstances.
For other expenses, reimbursement between co-owners depends on the type
of expense incurred and whether the co-owner claiming reimbursement has had
the enjoyment of the property purchased. Necessary expenses, expenses for
ordinary maintenance and repairs, and necessary management expenses paid to
a third party are reimbursable, but the party seeking reimbursement must offset
the value obtained through enjoyment of the property.1 1 2 The chief limitation
on reimbursement for expenses lies in the definition of a "necessary" expense.
"Necessary expenses" are those incurred for the preservation of the property or
for the discharge of private and public burdens. 3 This kind of expense is to
be distinguished from "useful" and "luxurious" expenses,' 4 neither of which
appears to be reimbursable under the new co-ownership rules.

Thus, a former spouse who uses separate property to alter or improve former
community property or to pay newly incurred expenses in connection with
former community property will not ipso facto be reimbursed for the amount
spent, as he or she would if the alteration or improvement had occurred prior to
termination of the community regime.
Enhancement and necessity are
limitations on reimbursement for post-termination expenditures.

110. Id. art. 496 (West 1980), art. 804 (West Supp. 1992). The articles give the co-owner who owes
reimbursement the choice of which amount to pay, but it is reasonable to assume that the least of the
amounts will always be chosen.
111. Id. art. 497 (West 1980), art. 804 (West Supp. 1992). The rule described in the text applies to
constructions subject to the rules of accession; that is, improvements that do not become merged with
the soil, such as houses, carports, or barns. Improvements or ameliorations inseparable from the soil
(drainage improvements, for example) are considered "useful expenditures," rather than constructions
subject to the accession rules. See id. art. 497 cmt. c.
112. Id. art. 806.
113. Id. art. 527. "Necessary" expenses include property taxes and assessments, indispensable repairs
and maintenance costs, and insurance costs, art. 527 cmt. b. See also id. arts. 1256, 1259 (West 1987).
114. "Useful expenses" are those that increase the property's value but without which it can be
preserved. Id. art. 528 (West 1980), art. 1259 (West 1985). Normally, a possessor of property is entitled
to reimbursement from the owner for useful expenses to the extent they have enhanced the property's
value. Id. art. 528, art. 1257 (West 1985). "Expenses for mere pleasure" (that is, "luxurious expenses")
are those made only for the accommodation or convenience of the owner or possessor and that do not
increase the property's value. Id. art. 1259. There is no reimbursement for luxurious expenses, although
the maker of a luxurious construction is allowed to remove it if removal will not damage the property.
Id. art. 1258 (West 1987). See generally 2 A.N. YIANNOPOuLOs, LOUISIANA CIVIL LAW TREATISE:
PROPERTY § 275 (3d ed. 1991).
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Not all separate claims for reimbursement of expenditures made during the
marriage would turn out differently under the new co-ownership rules. The
Cabralresult likely would be the same. Payment of a mortgage debt attributable
to an acquisition or improvement of community real estate probably is treated
under the co-ownership rules not as an improvement, for which reimbursement
is subject to the enhancement limitation, but as a necessary expense, reimbursable regardless of enhancement. Louisiana's definition of "necessary" expense
includes the "discharge of private and public burdens.""' 5 Hence, if the
mortgage for the acquisition and improvement is considered a private burden,
the co-ownership rules will allow reimbursement for the full amount spent.
One other feature in the new co-ownership law might affect the Cabral
outcome. Under new article 799, a co-owner is liable for "damage" to the
property caused by his "fault.' 1 6 "Fault" in Louisiana is a concept involving
a more stringent standard of care than the "fraud or bad faith" standard
applicable between spouses during the community regime. "Fraud" and "bad
faith" imply an intent to cause harm,' 7 while "fault" can include not only the
intentional causing of harm, but also "the want of care which a prudent man
usually takes in his business.""' 8 The official comment to new article 799
indicates that, at least where a co-owner has undertaken to manage the co-owned
property, "fault" is to have the meaning that includes the want of care of a
prudent man." 9
If, however, "damage" in new article 799 means only physical damage and
does not include economic loss, reimbursement would still be allowed under the
co-ownership articles in the Cabralsituation, despite the higher standard of care,
because the damage in Cabral was economic rather than physical. Damage
should include economic loss whenever one of the co-owners undertakes to
manage the co-owned project. The types of losses that are actionable should
relate to what the co-owner undertook to do. If he or she undertook the general
oversight and management of the project, he or she should be liable for the
various kinds of losses that can occur, including economic loss. Under this view

115. LA. Civ. CODE ANN. art. 527 (West Supp. 1992).
116. Id. art. 799.
117. See id. art. 1997 cmt. c (West 1987).
118. Id. art. 3506(13) (West Supp. 1992).
119. The official comment refers to article 576, the standard of care of a usufructuary: fraud, default,
or neglect. A co-owner who undertakes to manage is similar to a usufructuary who is in possession of
the property. The official comments to the usufruct article describe the standard of care of a
usufructuary as "prudent man." Id. art. 576 cmts. b & c (West 1980). Katherine Spaht states that "fault"
in new article 799 does not impose on a co-owner a duty to manage. Be that as it may, a reimbursement
claim involves a co-owner who has undertaken to manage the co-owned property by using his or her
personal funds on the co-owned property. Katherine Spaht, Developments in the law 1989-90:
Matrimonial Regimes, 51 LA. L. REv. 321, 331 (1990). In the situation of a co-owner who has
undertaken to manage the property, the "fault" standard should make the co-owner liable for the want
of care to be expected of a prudent man. As Spaht points out, prudent administration was the standard
applicable prior to the enactment of article 799 under the law of quasi-contract to a co-owner who
undertook to manage the co-owned property. Id. at 331. Thus, the "prudent man" or "prudent
administrator" standard is not new in the context of a co-owner who undertakes to manage.
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of "damage," the reimbursement claim of a co-owner who undertook to manage
the co-owned project, but whose neglect allowed economic losses to mount,
would be offset, at least to some extent, by the loss neglect had caused. An
analogous situation to that of the co-owner who undertakes to manage is that of
the quasi-contract, known in Louisiana as negotiorum gestio, or management of
the affairs of another. Such a manager is entitled to the reimbursement of
12
expenses only if he or she has managed as a "prudent administrator.""
The
broad interpretation of "damage" applied whenever a co-owner has undertaken
to manage the co-owned property is consistent with the concept of prudent
administration in the law of quasi-contract. If the analogy is correct, the fault
standard of care would give a court more leeway to limit or deny reimbursement
in a case such as Cabral.
Under the new co-ownership law, the rules of reimbursement that utilize
enhanced value and necessity as limitations are drawn directly from the law of
accession, a body of law that is permeated with the principle of unjust

enrichment.121 These rules of accession are rejected by the community regime's
rules, which instead provide reimbursement of the amount of separate property
used. 12 Now that the unjust enrichment principles have resurfaced in the
marital context to govern the rights of ex-spouses who co-own unpartitioned
community property, the wisdom of the rejection of these principles in the
community regime ought to be reexamined. One might also question why there
should be two different standards of care, one during marriage and the other

after termination, applicable to a spouse who undertook to manage by using his
or her separate property for community or former community obligations or
property,1 23 and why the same standard in both cases should not be "fault."
VII
REVISION OF LOUISIANA'S RULES

The rules governing separate claims to reimbursement ought to protect the
community interest of the nonclaimant spouse more than they do at present. As
120. LA. Civ. CODE ANN. art. 2298. The standard of care is so high that article 2298 permits the
court to be lenient where the gestor (manager) undertook the management out of friendship or necessity.
121. Symeon Symeonides, Developments in the Law 1983-84: Property, 45 LA. L. REV. 541, 546
(1984). In the French civil law of unjust enrichment (known as the actio de in rem verso), one seeking
recovery must show that enrichment still exists at the time the action for reimbursement is brought, not
merely at the time the expenditure is made. Barry Nicholas, Unjustified Enrichmentin the Civil Law and
Louisiana Law, 36 TUL. L. REV. 605, 645 (1962). The pre-1980 community property jurisprudence
imposing the requirement of continuing benefit to the community upon a husband claiming
reimbursement for his separate estate was thus consistent with the civil law of unjust enrichment and
accession.
122. See LA. Civ. CODE ANN. art. 2367 cmt. Symeonides, supra note 121, at 554; Katherine Spaht,
Developments in the Law, 1983-84: MatrimonialRegimes, 45 LA. L. REV. 417, 418-19 (1984).
123. See Katherine Spaht, Post Dissolution Management of Former Community Property: An
Unresolved Problem, 1990 Wis. L. REV.705 (1990) (praising California Civil Code § 5125 as amended
in 1986 extending the standard of care then applicable in California to management during the marriage
[good faith between persons having relationships of personal confidence] to the management of former
community property until it is divided).
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a political matter, the smaller the change in the present rules necessary to
achieve this goal, the more readily it will be accepted. After all, the present
rules are not yet old. It is unlikely that legislative energy and enthusiasm could
be summoned in favor of a major overhaul so soon after the intense legislative
process that culminated in the system of which the present reimbursement rules
are a part. Thus, political reality is currently a limitation on the optimal revision.
The present rules are as simple as reimbursement rules can possibly be. Any
revision to do greater justice to the community would add complexity to the code
articles. One way to avoid complicating the rules would be to authorize the
judge to weigh, on a case-by-case basis, the equities when reimbursement is
sought. The judge would simply have discretion to limit or deny reimbursement
as equitable factors would seem to warrant, much like the power the judge has
under some versions of equitable distribution of property at divorce. 124 Such
broad judicial discretion, however, makes outcomes less predictable and
settlement harder to achieve.1"
This result would be inconsistent with
Louisiana's 1980 attempt to create a comprehensive set of fixed rules to govern
marital property disputes. It is preferable to accept some complexity in the rules
in an effort to make the fixed rules more fair than to dump yet another problem
in the lap of the judge as weigher of equities.
A similar danger of increased litigation inheres in raising the standard of care
in the management of the community property during the marriage from
avoidance of fraud and bad faith to the more stringent "fault" standard. "Fault"
is the standard of care owed between the former spouses after termination of the
regime under the new co-ownership articles. 6 Even people with no previous
127
legal relationship to each other may owe each other this standard of care.
Ideally, spouses should owe each other at least this standard of care during the
marriage. Perhaps the risk that "fault" in the management of the community
property would become an issue in the termination of every community regime
is too much for the judicial system to bear. But it might not offend judicial
economy for "fault" to be the standard applied to a spouse seeking reimbursement for separate funds spent on a community enterprise or investment, the
management of which was undertaken by the claimant spouse. If the fault of the
spouse seeking reimbursement is present in the circumstances occasioning the use
of his or her separate property, reimbursement could be limited or denied. Thus,
a spouse managing community property who negligently incurred or extended
community obligations might only receive partial reimbursement, or none at all,
for separate property that was applied to those obligations. If restricted to
124. Martha Fineman, Societal Factors Affecting the Creation of Legal Rules for Distribution of
Property at Divorce, 23 FAM. L.Q. 279, 284-86 (1989).
125. See J. Thomas Oldham, Tracing, Commingling, and Transmutation, 23 FAM. L.Q. 219, 249-50
(1989); Mary Ann Glendon, Fixed Rules and Judicial Discretion in Contemporary Family Law and
Succession Law, 60 TUL. L. REV. 1165 (1986).
126. See supra text accompanying notes 116-23.
127. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2315 (West Supp. 1992): "Every act whatever of man that causes
damage to another obliges him by whose fault it happened to repair it."
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claims for reimbursement, "fault" could serve as a check on the fairness of the
claim without overburdening the system.
A requirement of consent by the spouse against whom reimbursement is
claimed also seems an advisable basic protection if reimbursement is to be
allowed for separate funds spent on a community investment regardless of the
success or failure of the investment. But a consent requirement raises several
additional questions. How must consent be manifested? Will confirmation (that
is, ratification), authorization, or estoppel suffice for consent? To what must the
consent pertain? The initial acquisition? Subsequent management decisions as
well? As with the issue of fault, if protection of the community interest of the
spouse against whom reimbursement is claimed could be achieved without
injecting litigious issues such as consent, so much the better.
From among the methods of protecting the community that do not involve
litigating fault or consent, one is tempted to choose, with respect to reimbursement for acquisitions and improvements, a measure of reimbursement limited by
the enhancement to the community. If Louisiana had a clean slate upon which
to write reimbursement rules, one might advocate adopting the French subsisting
profit approach to calculating reimbursement. A pro-rata reimbursement
approach, similar to the French approach to acquisitions, has been adopted in
Arizona for those situations when community funds have made payments on a
purchase money mortgage on separate property.128 Alternatively, Louisiana
could adopt the enhanced value limitation on the amount to be reimbursed from
the new Louisiana law of co-ownership. However, in 1979 enhancement was
specifically rejected by the Louisiana legislature as the measure of reimbursement.
It would probably be easier politically to build upon the approach of
reimbursing the "amount or value [of separate property] ... that ... was used"

that is already in place in Louisiana. Louisiana could easily borrow from
California, since California now uses this approach at divorce or judicial
separation for acquisitions and improvements of community property made with
separate funds. 129 The second sentence of the first paragraph of Louisiana's
article 2367 should be deleted and replaced with the following sentence adapted
from California's Civil Code section 4800.2: "The amount reimbursed shall not
exceed the net value of the thing for which the separate property was used."
This change would prevent the reimbursement claim on a losing project from
exceeding the value of that project, thus causing other community property to
be used to satisfy the reimbursement claim. It should also be made explicit, as
128. See Drahos v. Rens, 717 P.2d 927 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1985) (giving reimbursement to the community
calculated on a pro-rata basis). California, Nevada, and New Mexico give the community a pro-rata
share of ownership instead of reimbursement. Marriage of Moore, 618 P.2d 208 (Cal. 1980); Malmquist
v. Malmquist, 792 P.2d 372 (Nev. 1990); Dorbin v. Dorbin, 731 P.2d 959 (N.M. Ct. App. 1986). See
William A. Reppy, Jr., Repayment with Community Funds of Consumer Loans Secured by Separate
Realty: Seeking the Appropriate Remedy, 14:4 CoMMUNTrY PROP. J. 1 (Jan. 1988) (comparing pro-rata
approaches).
129. See supra text accompanying notes 83-86.
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it is in California, that payment with separate property of a debt related to a
community acquisition or improvement falls under this rule and not under a
different rule for payment of debts. Finally, it may also be desirable to specify,
as does California, that reimbursable expenditures include only those that add
to the equity in the property, not expenditures for interest, taxes, maintenance,
or insurance. This gives the community the maximum interest in the property
consistent with allowing some reimbursement to the separate estate. This last
provision is not as critical a change as the limitation of reimbursement to the net
value of the asset on which the separate expenditure was made. It could be
13
eliminated if legislators thought it to be too harsh on the separate estate. 0
As for reimbursement for family expenses, California's law suggests that
when a spouse has opted unilaterally to reserve the fruits from separate property
as separate, as in California where such fruits are automatically separate, he or
she ought not to be entitled to reimbursement for separate property used for
family expenses. The reasoning for this rule would not be the same in Louisiana
as it is in California-that is, that the separate property is deemed to have been
donated to the community-rather, Louisiana's reason would be that a spouse
should not be able unilaterally to withhold the fruits from the community and
claim reimbursement. Reimbursement would be available only to a spouse who
had generously made the fruits of his or her separate property available to the
community for investments and family expenses, or where both spouses agreed
that a spouse need not contribute the fruits of his or her separate property.
A rule such as California's family expense rule would be difficult to apply in
Louisiana because, under Louisiana's article 2339, a spouse may reserve the fruits
of some, but not necessarily all separate property. Would it be fair to invoke a
no-reimbursement rule if the fruits of ninety percent of the separate property still
accrued to the community? Fifty percent? In such cases, and in cases where
both spouses agree that the fruits of separate property of the reimbursement
claimant will be separate, or where the fruits are community under the general
rule, some reimbursement ought to be given for family expenses. It is thus
sensible to allow reimbursement for family expenses in all cases, but to make the
measure of reimbursement the device for preventing easy depletion of the
community property remaining at divorce.
Louisiana could emulate France, placing the burden on the courts to
scrutinize the amount claimed and the purpose of the expense to determine
whether it was "necessary" or beneficial. Absent guidelines, however, this
approach would inject uncertainty into the law similar to that found until
130. Arguably, reimbursement to the separate estate should include interest, taxes, and insurance
not to exceed the net value of the property. The community, not the separate estate, has had the use
of the separate funds spent on the community property. This is true even if the spouse whose separate
funds were spent occupied the community property on which the separate funds were spent, for during
the marriage, living accommodations are a community responsibility. If the community property upon
which the separate funds were used generated income, the income was community property. Having
received no benefit from the separate funds once they were spent on the community property, the
separate estate owes no offset against its claim for reimbursement for all amounts spent.
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recently in the area of child support.131 A more objective measure of reimbursement, if also fair, is preferable to a less objective measure that would
increase litigation.
When community property remains after deduction of obligations to third
parties and reimbursement for acquisitions and improvements, the community
ought to reimburse the separate estate for family expenses because it can afford
to do so, provided reimbursement does not exhaust the community. An
objective method of determining the amount that reimbursement should not
exceed is necessary. One possible rule would be to allow reimbursement in an
amount not to exceed a legislatively determined fraction of the remaining
community property, such as one-fourth or one-third. Application of this rule
has the advantage of not involving any discovery or valuation of property beyond
what is already necessary in a partition. Determination by the legislature of a
fraction of available property is a method commonly employed in Louisiana for
establishing the fair amount of a claim. In Louisiana inheritance law, forced
heirs are entitled to claim a certain fraction of the decedent's estate.132 Also,
the present Louisiana Code article concerning postdivorce alimony limits the
amount owed to one-third of the payor's income.133 Similarly, the "marital
portion," that is, the claim of a surviving spouse from the succession of the
wealthy deceased spouse, is likewise a legislatively determined fraction." This
fractional method of limiting the reimbursement claim for family expenses could
easily be incorporated into article 2365, which concerns family expenses, by
amending the second paragraph to read: "Nevertheless, if the community
obligation was incurred for the expenses of the marriage, or for the support,
maintenance and education of the children of either spouse, the amount of
reimbursement shall not exceed [some fraction] of the community after
deduction of all community obligations and reimbursement due under article
2367."
Another method for determining the maximum reimbursable fraction of
remaining community property is to use the ratio of the separate funds spent on
family expenses to the total income during the marriage, separate plus
community. Proof of the separate and community income on hand during the
marriage could be obtained from income tax records, which would not add
greatly to the present burden of discovery in partitions. The results produced
under this second fractional method might seem as arbitrary as those under the
first fractional method, in the sense that the method ignores the actual
availability of separate and community funds at any particular time during the
marriage. It also ignores proof that the remaining community property is in fact
traceable only to a community source, as when, one month prior to termination,
a spouse received a large contingent fee. Yet proportionality is already a
131.
132.
133.
134.

See Oldham, supra note 125, at 250.
LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 1495 (West Supp. 1992).
Id. art. 112.
Id. art. 2434.
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concept accepted in Louisiana's community property law in the context of the
authority of one spouse, acting alone, to make usual or customary gifts of
community property. Under Civil Code article 2349, if made by one spouse
alone, such gifts must be of a value "commensurate with the economic position
of the spouses at the time of the donation." The Code intentionally used the
term "spouses," rather than "community," to make the separate property of the
spouses, not just the community property, relevant to how much community
property a spouse may give away without the other spouse's consent. A
separately wealthy spouse, for example, should be more limited in the amount
of community property he or she can give away without the other spouse's
consent than if he or she had no separate property, especially if the other spouse
has no separate property. 35
The proportionate reimbursement concept could be embodied in the
following amendment to Civil Code article 2365, again with as little change in the
language of the present article as possible:
If separate property of a spouse has been used to satisfy a community obligation
other than an obligation for the acquisition, improvement, use, or benefit of a
community thing, that spouse, upon termination of the community property
regime, is entitled to reimbursement from the other spouse of one-half of an
amount equal to a portion of the community property remaining after deduction
of all community obligations to third persons and amounts spent for which
reimbursement is due under article 2367. The portion shall be in the ratio that
the separate funds used by the spouse claiming reimbursement bears to the sum
of the separate and community income on hand during the marriage. The
amount of reimbursement shall not exceed the amount spent.

The following hypotheticals demonstrate how this proposal would operate.
Assume that the total of the community income of the spouses during the
marriage was $100,000. During the marriage, the wife's sole separate property
was inherited stock that she sold for $50,000. She proves that she spent $40,000
on family expenses and $10,000 on an improvement of a piece of community
property. At termination, the entire community, net of debts to third persons,
is worth $50,000. Under present law, the wife's total reimbursement claim of
$50,000 would exhaust the community property. Under the proposal, however,
she would receive reimbursement of $10,000 from the remaining community for
the improvement. That would leave a community of $40,000. Of this, her
reimbursement portion from the undivided community would be 26.67% (40,000
+ 150,000) or $10,668. The remaining $29,332 would be community property to
be divided equally. The husband would thus end up with $14,666, rather than
zero.136 If, after termination, the community had been worth $1,000,000, the
135. See Oldham, supra note 2 (discussing the Texas proportionality test for the reasonableness of
a gift of community property).
136. The present articles on reimbursement are formulated in terms of spouse-to-spouse, rather than
community-to-spouse reimbursement, as if each spouse receives half of the community property net of
debts to third parties, and then pays reimbursement out of his or her half. To be consistent with the
present formulation, the proposed formulation states the formula for reimbursement in spouse-to-spouse
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wife7 would have been reimbursed the full $40,000 she spent on family expens13
es.
If no community property remains after deduction of debts to third parties
and reimbursement for acquisitions and improvements, under the fractional
proposals the spouse who spent his or her separate funds on family expenses
would not be entitled to reimbursement. This result is contrary to the second
paragraph of present article 2365, which obligates a spouse to pay reimbursement
for, among other things, ordinary and customary expenses of the marriage, even
though the community property is exhausted. If the community has reached the
point of insolvency, the burden of these expenses should be left where it lay:
upon the spouse who paid them with separate property. The second paragraph
of present article 2365 should thus be deleted.
VIII
CONCLUSION

As one who participated in the writing of the legislation that eventually
became Louisiana Civil Code articles 2325-2347, the author feels a special
responsibility to urge modification of any of the rules that, in practice, have
caused or may cause hardship to a spouse whose only asset is his or her
community interest. 138 Equal management ought not to have left the community at partition so vulnerable to the spouse claiming reimbursement of his
separate estate, yet some reimbursement is appropriate. Without engendering
too much additional discovery or litigation, reimbursement for separate funds

terms. Thus, the spouse owing reimbursement pays one half of the amount to be reimbursed to the
other spouse. As applied to the example in the text, the spouse-to-spouse formulation means that the
husband pays a total of $10,334 in reimbursement ($5000 + $5334) from his $25,000 half of the
community net of obligations to third persons, leaving him with $14,666.
137. A different fractional approach is suggested by a student comment. The author explained his
pro-rata theory in terms of a "savings-ratio." The community property on hand at dissolution is the
savings from the total community and separate income on hand during the marriage. The ratio of the
remaining property to the total of community and separate income during the marriage is the "savings
ratio." This ratio multiplied by the separate income equals the separate savings (and hence the amount
of separate reimbursement); multiplied by the community income equals the community savings (and
hence the amount of community property that will be divided after reimbursement). The author
suggests, however, that the savings ratio of the particular family might be modified by averaging it with
the average savings ratio of a family having the same total income, the second ratio to be obtained from
statistical data. Ehrenpries, Comment, supra note 78.
138. The author was a member of the advisory committee to the Joint Legislative Subcommittee on
Community Property, 1978-79. The advisory committee and joint subcommittee produced 1978
Louisiana Acts No. 627, the equal management reform, containing the precursors of the reimbursement
articles discussed herein. Between the 1978 and 1979 legislative sessions, the Louisiana State Law
Institute was directed to redraft the legislation to conform its style to the Civil Code, but without
changing the policy decisions embodied in Act 627. The present Code articles are thus the work of the
Louisiana State Law Institute in style, but not in substance. The writer recalls hardly any discussion in
the advisory committee or joint subcommittee of the reimbursement rules. Time was short; the case of
Kirchberg v. Feenstra, 450 U.S. 455 (1981), which ultimately declared Louisiana's husband-management
system unconstitutional, was pending. Thus, the committee's attention was focused on the effect of equal
management upon the spouses' interaction with third parties, rather than the effect between the spouses.
See generally Symposium on Community Property, 39 LA. L. REv. 323 (1979).

Page 273: Spring 1993]

LOUISIANA'S REIMBURSEMENT RULES

307

used for community investments could be limited to the net value of the property
upon which the separate funds were spent, and the separate estate could be
reimbursed an amount for separate funds spent on family expenses not to exceed
a fractional share of remaining community assets. Reimbursement for family
expenses after the community is exhausted should not be permitted. As extra
protection for the, community, the standard of care in the management of the
community property applicable to a spouse who claims reimbursement of his or
her separate estate should be upgraded to "fault" in the sense of prudent
administration. These adjustments to the existing law would help restore the
primacy of the spouses' common endeavor, represented by the community
property, over a spouse's separate endeavor.

